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NO. 16 MARCH 2019 Introduction 
Disinformation and Elections to the 
European Parliament 
Annegret Bendiek and Matthias Schulze 
Elections to the European Parliament (EP) will take place in May 2019. Politicians 
and experts fear that the election process might be disrupted by disinformation cam-
paigns and cyber attacks. In December 2018, the European Commission presented an 
action plan against disinformation. It provided 5 million euros for raising awareness 
amongst voters and policymakers about manipulation, and for increasing the cyber 
security of electoral systems and processes. The strategy relies on voluntary and non-
binding approaches by Internet companies to fight disinformation. To protect the 
integrity of elections in the medium term, independent research into technical, legal 
and market-regulating reforms must be boosted. The objective should be to preserve 
the functionality of democracies and elections in the age of digitalisation. 
 
The next European elections will be held in 
EU member states from 23 to 26 May 2019. 
Since right-wing nationalist and Euro-sceptic 
movements have gained in strength, there 
is already talk of a “defining election” that 
could decisively influence the future ori-
entation of the EU. Euro-sceptic parties 
already account for almost one-third of 
parliamentarians, a proportion that might 
rise following the elections. 
EP elections have thus far been seen as 
“second-rank elections” and therefore as a 
good opportunity by the electorate to teach 
the respective member state’s government 
a lesson. This attitude fails to appreciate the 
mobilisation potential of the current debate 
on the pros and cons of European integra-
tion, the influence of third parties, and the 
growing importance of the EP. The elections 
are extremely significant for the strategic 
orientation of European integration. A suc-
cess for EU opponents could push the EU 
to the very limits of its capacity to act, for 
example through further exit demands 
along the lines of Brexit, or a blockade of 
the complex decision-making process. The 
elections not only decide the renewal of the 
EP, but also the inauguration of the new EU 
Commission for the 2019–2024 parliamen-
tary term. The EP influences the appoint-
ment of the Commissioners and can force 
the entire Commission to resign with a two-
thirds majority and realign the Multiannual 
Financial Framework. 
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Challenges 
The EU’s structure and functions are not 
easy to understand. European issues are 
unfamiliar to many, and it is relatively 
simple to spread false information about 
the EU. Considering the upcoming election, 
the European Commissioner for the Secu-
rity Union, Sir Julian King, urged member 
states to “take seriously the threat to demo-
cratic processes and institutions posed by 
cyber attacks and disinformation” and to 
draw up “national prevention plans” to pre-
vent “state and non-state actors from under-
mining our democratic systems and using 
them as weapons against us”. This specifi-
cally includes disinformation campaigns 
and cyber attacks on the electronic electoral 
infrastructure, which can affect the con-
fidentiality, availability and integrity of the 
electoral process. 
Disinformation already appears to have 
had an impact in Europe: researchers at 
Edinburgh University identified over 400 
false accounts on social networks, operated 
by so-called trolls based in St Petersburg, 
which were used to influence the Brexit 
referendum. Security and defence policy 
defines disinformation and cyber attacks 
as elements of hybrid threats, i.e. covert 
actions by third parties aimed at destabilis-
ing Europe or the EU system. The term 
“hybrid threats” usually refers to a form of 
warfare that remains below the threshold of 
using military force. This ambiguity gener-
ally complicates a military response accord-
ing to international humanitarian law. 
Disinformation Campaigns 
Disinformation is not a new phenomenon. 
In security research it is regarded as “black” 
propaganda, since it seeks to influence pub-
lic opinion from the shadows. It uses the 
same means as modern public relations (PR) 
and advertising campaigns. 
In contrast to PR, however, disinfor-
mation wants to destabilise the pillars of 
democracy by attacking parties, elected 
politicians or the EU as a political system. 
Disinformation does not necessarily mean 
false information, since even true state-
ments taken out of context can be misused 
for suggestive conclusions. Disinformation 
campaigns can be short-term, for example 
to influence an election result, or long-
term, for instance to undermine confidence 
in the EU. Attempts can thus be made to 
discredit individual politicians so as to pre-
vent them from being re-elected. For exam-
ple, “negative campaigning” can uncover 
alleged scandals or make accusations of cor-
ruption. During the last presidential elec-
tion campaign in the USA, automated com-
puter programmes known as Twitter bots, 
probably of Russian origin, spread predomi-
nantly negative reports about Hillary Clin-
ton and relatively positive reports about 
Donald Trump. In the medium term, this 
promotes social division and the polarisa-
tion of public discourse. 
The negotiation of political interests in 
social discourses is the key element – but 
also the Achilles heel – of democracies. 
Tactics such as disseminating dubious 
claims (“muddying the waters”) or constantly 
repeating large volumes of false information 
or conspiracy theories (“firehose of false-
hood”) are used to undermine political cer-
tainties and dissolve a socially shared con-
cept of truth. One example was the reaction 
to the downing of a Malaysian passenger 
plane in July 2014: on social networks, 
there were attempts to discredit the investi-
gation report which found that the Russian 
armed forces had caused the catastrophe. 
IT-Enabled Disinformation 
A distinction must be made between digital 
and IT-enabled disinformation: digital dis-
information encompasses the entire range 
of digital mechanisms for disseminating 
information. IT-enabled disinformation, on 
the other hand, includes hacking incidents 
or cyber attacks that compromise IT secu-
rity, namely confidentiality, availability and 
integrity of data or systems. The technical 
hack is only one of many means by which 
the confidentiality of information can be 
violated, for example by stealing sensitive 
information from the accounts of politi-
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cians, parties or officials and then publish-
ing it with harmful intent (doxing). Well-
known examples are the publication of 
e-mails from the US Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) on the WikiLeaks plat-
form in 2016 and from the Emmanuel 
Macron campaign team in 2017. 
The restriction of the availability of tech-
nical systems via cyber attacks can facilitate 
disinformation campaigns as well. Espe-
cially in authoritarian regimes, websites of 
opposition politicians, parties and services 
such as Twitter and Facebook are deliber-
ately paralysed shortly before elections 
by “distributed denial of service” attacks, 
meaning the deliberate overload of the 
server concerned. Similarly, the digital 
voting infrastructure with its voting com-
puters and counting systems can be dis-
rupted and manipulated. 
Digital Disinformation 
Digital disinformation has the advantage 
of having low costs while having a high im-
pact: with few resources, a global audience 
can be reached with customised disinfor-
mation through digital technologies. Digital 
disinformation employs the legitimate 
means of the advertising industry to target 
users based on their individual behaviour 
profiles (so-called “targeted ads” and 
“micro-targeting”). 
Social networks such as Facebook were 
not developed for the purpose of democratic 
discourse, but to analyse and categorise 
their users’ interests and behaviour, and 
sell this information to third parties for 
advertising purposes. According to their 
behaviour patterns, users will be shown 
content that other users of the same cat-
egory or with a similar behaviour profile 
also prefer. Algorithms thus ensure that 
users are shown more of the same so as 
to hold their attention and keep it on the 
platforms as long as possible. These so-
called filter bubbles arise directly from the 
business model of online platforms to bring 
advertising to as many users as possible. 
If the same opinions are grouped together 
and, simultaneously, differing views are 
hidden, a self-referential “echo chamber” 
can develop. In online forums that bring 
together only like-minded users, the latter’s 
perceptions tend to be strengthened be-
cause they do not experience any contra-
diction. 
Disinformation has a particularly polaris-
ing effect on already politicised groups with 
strong ideological stances. These can be de-
liberately targeted with conspiracy theories 
that fit their worldview. One example is the 
campaign against alleged rape by asylum 
seekers, the so called Lisa case of 2016. Dur-
ing the 2016 US election campaign, there 
were incidents where supporters of the 
right-wing Alternative Right movement and 
left-wing groups were separately invited via 
Facebook to take part in the same demon-
stration, in the hope of provoking a violent 
escalation. 
Conspiracy theories and disinformation 
can quickly be shared worldwide over social 
networks. This can be accomplished using 
a mix of automated accounts (“social bots”), 
hybrid accounts (partly human, partly auto-
mated) and so-called troll armies or 50-cent 
armies. Such “armies” consist of state actors 
or privately organised commentators who 
systematically disseminate certain narra-
tives in social media or on news sites. Often 
volunteers also unknowingly spread dis-
information (“unwitting agents”). In the 
2016 US election campaign, US citizens 
spread Kremlin propaganda without know-
ing its source. But traditional media cover-
age is also involved, as it increasingly takes 
up trending topics from social networks. 
If these contain disinformation, and the 
media carries them unreflectively, they re-
inforce the narratives or false reports. Dis-
information has a cumulative effect over 
longer periods of time. 
EU Counter-Strategies 
Holding EP elections is the responsibility 
of member states. Although they are doing 
much to protect the integrity of elections, 
mostly this is in the form of patchwork 
measures. There are concerns that the EP 
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elections will be manipulated, disrupted or 
unlawfully influenced by opponents of the 
EU, whether during the election campaign, 
at the ballot box or during the counting of 
votes. According to a Eurobarometer survey, 
83 percent of Europeans are worried about 
targeted disinformation on the Internet. The 
EU expects that targeted disinformation cam-
paigns will be present during election cam-
paigns. 
Disinformation Warfare 
Since 2015, the European Commission has 
been attempting to combat disinformation 
and technical influences using foreign and 
domestic policy measures. It has, inter alia, 
increased staffing and funding for the Euro-
pean Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) and set up an East StratCom 
Task Force within the European External 
Action Service (EEAS). The Task Force docu-
ments and regularly informs about disinfor-
mation campaigns in the north-eastern 
member states. This was followed in 2016 
by a Joint Communication and a Joint EU 
Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats. 
The Commission and the EEAS agree that 
such threats are increasingly causing 
trouble in the EU. 
The EU defines hybrid threats as “a mix-
ture of military and civilian warfare by 
state and non-state actors such as covert 
military operations, intense propaganda 
and economic harassment”. These aggres-
sions, it believes, not only cause direct 
damage and exploit vulnerabilities, but also 
destabilise societies and promote the divi-
sion of the EU “through cover-ups”. Internal 
and external security must therefore be 
even more closely interlinked. 
Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker, in his speech on the state of the 
Union 2018, proposed a series of concrete 
measures to ensure that the May 2019 elec-
tions are free, fair and secure. Among other 
things, he called for more transparency in 
(often covert) political advertising on the 
Internet, and the possibility of sanctions if 
personal data are used illegally to influence 
the outcome of the European elections. 
Networks such as Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube have agreed on a Code of Practice 
on Disinformation to combat disinforma-
tion and fake accounts on their platforms. 
In October 2018, this Code was signed by 
Facebook, Google, Twitter and Mozilla, as 
well as professional associations operating 
online platforms and the advertising in-
dustry. 
Two months later, the Commission 
and the EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy presented an 
action plan against disinformation. Both 
launched the creation of an early warning 
system for information about disinforma-
tion. Five million euros and 50 staff posi-
tions were approved for it. The system is 
meant to be able to identify campaigns in 
real time and raise awareness of the prob-
lem. 
Since the EU fears being misrepresented 
beyond its borders as well, other teams are 
monitoring the spread of misinformation 
in North Africa, the Middle East and the 
Balkans. Furthermore, it has set up an elec-
toral network, elaborated a guide to the 
application of EU data protection law in 
elections, and given guidance on cyber 
security. As of February 2019, member 
states will be running a simulation of what 
would need to be done in the event of an 
attack. EU states rely on the exchange of 
experience. Further meetings are scheduled 
for spring 2019. In late January 2019, the 
Commission warned Internet companies 
that their transparency initiatives against 
covert advertising were not sufficient to 
protect the integrity of EP elections. 
Cyber Security Measures 
What is the EU doing about IT-enabled dis-
information? Critical infrastructure protec-
tion has long been subject to EU regulation. 
However, member states were unable to 
agree on defining voting systems as critical 
infrastructure as part of the 2016 Network 
and Information Security (NIS) Directive. 
The IT security of voting technology was 
considered a purely national task. However, 
reports of alleged influence on the Brexit 
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referendum and elections in France, Cata-
lonia and Belgium, have increased sensi-
tivity to the problem. In September 2017, 
the EU proposed a whole range of cyber-
security measures, including a pan-Euro-
pean network of cooperation between data 
protection authorities, to share knowledge 
on how elections are influenced. Only in 
December 2018 did EU states agree on a 
cyber security law that will strengthen the 
cyber security agency ENISA, and for the 
first time create a certification framework 
for the protection of critical infrastructures. 
When, that same month, a hacker pub-
lished explosive data on Twitter under the 
pseudonym “0rbit”, politicians demanded 
an “emergency plan to be able to react 
within a short time to the outflow of sen-
sitive data, digital industrial espionage or 
sabotage”. There are also calls for uniform 
minimum legal standards for the security of 
information technology equipment, which 
would mean replacing the voluntary certifi-
cation framework of the EU by a European 
regulation. This would apply, for example, 
to end-user devices such as mobile phones 
and laptops. Providers of online services 
and manufacturers of devices connected 
to the Internet would need to design their 
products in such a way that users must 
choose strong passwords and update them 
regularly. 
As well as making technical infrastruc-
tures more robust, the EU relies on opera-
tional cyber security measures. These in-
clude the development of better attribution 
capabilities for cyber attacks, an exchange 
of information, and a stronger role for 
Europol in the fight against cybercrime. If 
member states become the target of such 
attacks, they should be able to find out for 
themselves where the attacker came from, 
which security gaps were used, and which 
data was affected or extracted. The discus-
sion will focus on harsher penalties for 
cybercriminals and new criminal offences, 
such as the operation of criminal infra-
structures. With principles such as “security 
by design”, i.e. the development of hard-
ware and software that seeks to avoid weak 
points and manipulations from the outset, 
the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) contains a further building block for 
action against cyber attacks and disinfor-
mation. In January 2019, the EU also agreed 
on a relevant law that allows for fines to 
be imposed on political parties and founda-
tions that violate data protection rules in 
the European election campaign in order 
to influence voters. Parties can even lose 
all claims to EU party funding. The reason 
for this regulation was that Facebook had 
passed on user data to the British company 
Cambridge Analytica, which evaluated the 
data records of 220 million American Face-
book users to create user profiles for tar-
geted advertising. 
Cyber Security in Elections 
What measures are being taken to ensure 
the confidentiality, availability and integ-
rity of electronic voting systems? Following 
reports alleging that the US elections were 
unlawfully influenced, the Council of 
Europe’s Venice Commission has been in 
close contact with the electoral agencies of 
the 61 Council members. Electronic voting 
systems in member states vary widely. Elec-
tronic voting in the EU has so far only been 
used in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia and 
France. In Belgium, Flemish municipalities 
in particular use voting machines. In Bul-
garia, such machines will only be used in 
smaller polling stations in the 2019 EP elec-
tions. In France, the use of voting machines 
was suspended during the 2017 presidential 
election due to the alleged incidents in the 
US election. In other countries, such as Ger-
many or Austria, voting is exclusively by 
ballot paper, with information technology 
being used to determine the election result. 
The security of the IT systems is therefore 
essential when establishing the provisional 
election results. Estonia is the only country 
in the world that allows online voting via 
the Internet. 
Overarching assessments of the technical 
vulnerability of electronic voting systems are 
not possible, as EU countries use different 
voting computers and systems. However, 
since all voting computers can be manipu-
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lated, experts recommend a physical paper 
printout for each individual vote. In July 
2018, under Article 11 of the NIS Directive, 
representatives from 20 member states pre-
pared a compendium on the cyber security 
of elections. They called on member states to 
put in place specific security arrangements 
and contact points for an overarching Euro-
pean cooperation network. 
If individual constituencies experience 
irregularities during the actual voting, or 
technical problems with the vote count, 
elections in individual countries could be 
held again at short notice without the need 
for the entire European Parliament to be re-
elected. A cyber attack on a member state 
would mean that the allocation of seats in 
the EP could not be confirmed immediately. 
Targeted cyber attacks launched by third 
countries on individual elections can be 
sanctioned by the EU applying its Joint 
Diplomatic Response (Bendiek 2018). A 
comprehensive and serious attack on the EP 
elections would be seen as an attack on the 
EU. Under certain conditions this would 
allow the use of the solidarity clause under 
Article 222 TFEU or even the mutual assis-
tance clause under Article 42 para 7 TEU. 
Promoting Independent Research 
The EP elections decide on the new com-
position of the European Parliament, but 
election rules are a national responsibility. 
In many EU countries, local electoral 
authorities are responsible for conducting 
the election. Although they are aware of 
the danger of disinformation and cyber 
attacks, they are not sufficiently technically 
prepared for them. The credibility of the 
EP elections and thus of the EU is at stake. 
European policy-makers prefer short-term 
and more technical measures in close co-
operation with Internet companies to com-
bat disinformation and hold cyber-security 
exercises. Research on causes, however, 
is lacking. The findings of the various in-
dependent interdisciplinary research pro-
grammes on disinformation, cyber attacks 
and the conditions of democracy must 
therefore be taken into account more 
closely. 
Hybrid Threats? 
There is competition for responsibilities 
and resources between security and defence 
policy on the one hand, and domestic policy 
on the other. From the perspective of de-
fence policy, the phenomenon of disinfor-
mation belongs in the category of hybrid 
threats. But narrowing the subject in this 
way is not sufficient. In a 2017 congression-
al hearing, heads of American secret ser-
vices rightly stated that disinformation rep-
resents a new normal. According to NATO 
and the European Commission, Russia leads 
the way in the targeted dissemination of 
false information, but more than 30 other 
countries are also involved. Governments 
mandate think tanks and non-governmental 
organisations to provide analyses, so there 
is no shortage of relevant reports. The 
American Alliance for Securing Democracy, 
for example, or the Digital Forensic Re-
search Lab, financed by the Atlantic Coun-
cil and Facebook, concentrate their work 
primarily on Russia and China. Think tanks 
and political foundations dealing with 
disinformation must identify clients and 
financiers of their projects so as to avoid 
suspicions of partiality. 
However, false information does not only 
come from countries outside the EU, but is 
also disseminated within its member states. 
Political activism, especially from the anti-
European spectrum; the pretence of a grass-
roots movement (“astroturfing”); and the 
role of the tabloid media are at least as 
significant as external attempts at influ-
ence. Their impact on Brexit, for example, 
probably outweighed that of Twitter bots, 
which only has a user adoption of 17 per-
cent of the British population. 
The effectiveness of digital disinfor-
mation has not been scientifically proven. 
Recent studies on the relevance of filter 
bubbles have come to diverging conclu-
sions. Empirical data indicate that users 
deliberately choose certain formats and 
contents that differ from those of the estab-
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lished media. Filter bubbles of dissent do 
not seem to arise because users are un-
aware that information can be one-sided or 
false. Rather, the explicit interest of users in 
divergent opinions seems to be the decisive 
factor, accompanied by a steady loss of trust 
within democratic societies in political 
and public institutions. The idea that filter 
bubbles are deliberately formed and con-
trolled is reinforced by the fact that it seems 
to be small groups that spread “alternative 
facts”, disinformation and manifestly false 
reports in a particularly vocal way. The fear 
that digital algorithms could largely destroy 
social communication is thus probably ex-
aggerated. 
IT-Enabled Disinformation 
The EU’s technical measures to combat dis-
information campaigns and cyber attacks 
are only a first step. Ideally, they will direct 
member states to try to improve protection 
for the EP elections during the election 
campaigns, the actual voting and the vote 
count. Constant exchange and regular cyber 
security exercises are necessary to minimise 
dangers. However, most member states have 
so far failed to consider elections as a criti-
cal infrastructure for democracy and to 
secure them at a high level. Manufacturers 
and suppliers of critical IT products there-
fore urgently need to be made more ac-
countable. The problem of unsecured IT 
hardware and software in voting technology 
is still underestimated. In the long term, 
the EU must also be enabled to respond 
strategically, communicatively and with 
technical effectiveness to attempts at mani-
pulating elections, and must be provided 
with the necessary financial and human 
resources. Until this goal has been achieved, 
emergency teams can be deployed around 
the clock during the elections. 
The Supremacy of 
Internet Companies 
It is questionable, however, whether the 
weaknesses of European democracies as dis-
cussed above can be addressed effectively 
with short-term task forces and medium-
term action plans. Linguistic research shows 
that mere fact checking is more likely to 
inadvertently reinforce false information. 
The effectiveness of automated artificial-
intelligence systems in combating disinfor-
mation is also overestimated. Obviously, 
it is unrealistic to hope to eliminate false 
information completely. Instead of tackling 
symptoms, it would be useful to promote 
independent research to analyse proposals 
for short-term technical and policy meas-
ures. These should provide the blueprint for 
fundamental reforms in the data economy. 
Google’s global market share of 80 per-
cent of all search queries and Facebook’s 
and YouTube’s market share of 70 percent 
in social networks are an expression of 
the unprecedented concentration processes 
within communication infrastructure. 
Alongside the growing importance of digi-
tal audiences, communication in society is 
shifting towards a market-orientated arena 
where every “speech act” or announcement 
has its price. Private companies provide 
spaces for public digital discourse; access to 
them is controlled. Only those who enter 
into a private contractual relationship and 
make their contribution either financially 
or in the form of commercially usable data 
have a say. 
These social networks were developed 
for marketing purposes and do not cater 
for unconditional democratic participation 
based only on citizen status. They are com-
parable to a situation in which the parlia-
ment building is owned by a private pro-
vider, access to it is regulated according to 
economic criteria, and the loudspeaker 
volume and transmission of speeches to the 
outside world are assessed in line with mar-
ket conditions. The EU’s previous regulatory 
approaches, for example its insistence on 
voluntary commitments, do not do justice 
to this concentration of power. The Council 
and Commission were right to criticise the 
code of conduct currently in force. It con-
tained “no common measures, no substan-
tial obligations, no compliance or enforce-
ment measures”. When the personal data of 
numerous German politicians were illegally 
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published in December 2018, the online 
platform Twitter dragged its feet despite 
its voluntary commitment under the code. 
Large platform providers have hardly any 
competition to fear in Europe, meaning 
that a fundamental reform of the antitrust 
legislation is the last resort. Previous pro-
cedures for the evaluation and control of 
monopolies have often been inadequate. 
A key problem is merger control. Large 
companies buy burgeoning smaller com-
petitor start-ups before they can become a 
threat to their business model. A striking 
example of this is Facebook’s acquisition of 
WhatsApp and Instagram, and its merging 
of user data, against former promises not to 
do so. Election advertising on television and 
a stall on the high street are no longer what 
decides elections, but rather artificial-intel-
ligence technologies such as microtargeting. 
These are used to specifically address voters 
who are willing to change their minds and 
who can often tip the scales. Only the EU, 
with its economic power as a whole, can 
fight the power of transnational digital cor-
porations. In this context, the EP elections 
are a historic turning point: European 
policy means tackling the major fundamen-
tal issues of the European communication 
order, such as the control of platform 
monopolies and excessive communicative 
power. During EP election campaigns, po-
litical parties and organisations must com-
mit themselves to bringing transparency to 
their campaign activities and to preventing 
the use of social bots. 
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